Economists anonymous  

The Economist reads the IMF's latest deal with Argentina as a kind of existential angst:

Argentina’s self-confidence in negotiations may reflect the IMF’s self-doubt. After the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the Fund was roundly criticised for demanding too much fiscal austerity. After the Argentine default of 2001, it was criticised for demanding too little. Even as it negotiated specific conditions with Argentina, the IMF was asking itself a number of awkward questions about “conditionality” in general. How tough should its loan requirements be, and how strictly should they be enforced? Should the Fund, an outfit of technocratic macroeconomists, really be in the business of prescribing microeconomic reforms, such as cutting fuel subsidies or raising charges for public services?

But the New York Times calls the deal one of a kind:

[a]nalysts say that the Argentine deal was probably a one-time thing. Brazil has the clout - it is a big enough debtor - to play hardball with the fund, though it probably would not, analysts said. Smaller debtors like Ecuador, though, simply do not have the leverage to extract concessions from the IMF.

I don't have any insight into which analysis is more accurate, but it will be interesting to see how this latest deal affects the IMF's negotiating position in the future. I'm generally a proponent of strong international institutions, but in the case of the IMF it seems like a lot of the after-the-fact economic belt-tightening they impose is of the theoretical (ie sketchy) variety. Certainly sorting through the Asian financial mess and the Argentinian meltdown is a worthy endeavor.