Of course one could choose to have more principles than I've listed. One could believe, for example, that 51% majority rule is very important for representative bodies or that supermajorities are important for the selection of judges. But that doesn't mean that somebody who doesn't have those principles is principled.

The notion that these decisions should be decided according to prearranged rules (themselves subject to revision by prearranged rule and so on) is a principle in and of itself, and all one needs to resolve the question. This means that the Constitutional Option is right if and only if the filibuster is indeed unConstitutional, which is a tough legal question that probably can't be resolved in a blog post, but probably can be resolved by a bunch of very sharp lawyers.

Does the Constitutional option really involve a look at the constitutionality of the filibuster? I guess I thought that was just an attractive repackaging of the effort to change senate rules (ie appealing to some popular idea of constitutionality rather than taking on the question in earnest).

I agree with you that the question can and should be decided according to the prearranged rules (which I agree themselves constitute a principle). I just felt there were potentially other arguable principles here than those rules -- but you seem to agree with me on this point.

The thing I like about the blogosphere is that every time I spout off some half baked theory, people come out of the woodwork to call me on it.

Will Baude has cited a genuine principle, namely, that the issue should be decided according to prearranged rules. He's more sanguine than I that a bunch of "very sharp lawyers" can determine the legality of the nuclear option without resorting to politics (the internal rules of a legislative body are super duper double ultra political becuase there is essentially no judicial review - when the Senate votes on a matter the Senate gets to decide, it's over). There are already sharp lawyers on both sides of this issue. But Will has articulated a principle. So I overstated. It happens.

Yglesias comes close to articulating a principle (the one mentioned by Will regarding the importance of 51% majorities). But Yglesias goes further than that, into the realm of political preferences, in his assertion that bare majorities would lead to more progressive politics.

Still, the point remains, there are principled positions on the filibuster issue. The point of my post, which incidentally remains MOSTLY correct, is that most folks are arguing from unprincipled positions, and using principled-sounding language only as a rhetorical weapon.

But I overstated. I did. My bust.

Oh, I agree with you generally. In fact I would expand the claim to include not just positions on the filibuster, but almost all the political bluster on the internet.

As far as Yglesias goes, he certainly has a political agenda, but that doesn't mean his position isn't principled -- in this case what he's really talking about institutional design and change, and his position on that (even if our politics are similar) is radically different from mine, for example. That may not have been the best example because he was explicitly writing a strategy piece -- but Nathan Newman has made many of the same points within a majority rules rubric.